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I present a model in which credit and outside money can be used as means of
payment in order to analyze how access to credit a⁄ects welfare when credit markets
feature limited participation. Allowing more agents to use credit has an ambiguous
e⁄ect on welfare because it may make consumption-risk sharing more ine¢ cient. I
calibrate the model using U.S. data on credit-card transactions and show that the
increase in access to credit from 1990 to the near present has had a slightly negative
impact on welfare.
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11 Introduction
In modern economies, two types of money are widely used: outside money (i.e. notes and
coins issued by central banks) and inside money issued by commercial banks (e.g., checks
or credit cards). Transactions do not only di⁄er in the monetary instrument used: Whereas
some of them involve a credit operation, like those carried out with credit cards, others
require the acquisition of money balances prior to the transaction. Over the last few decades,
major changes have occurred in consumer methods of payments, owing to a large extent to
technological improvements which have substantially altered the convenience of using plastic
money as opposed to paper money. In particular, the relative importance of transactions
conducted with credit cards has increased compared to transactions in which no credit is
granted. While at the beginning of the 1970s all general-purpose payment cards (including
credit cards) only accounted for less than 2% of the volume of all consumer expenditures,
in the late 2000s about one ￿fth of the expenditures were settled with credit cards. Factors
like the reduction in the time to process credit-card transactions, the decline in the cost of
telecommunications, or the enhancement of bank techniques for screening and monitoring
an increasing number of customers are crucial in explaining the observed rise in the share of
credit transactions.1
However, outside money is still extensively used. For instance, in 2008 in the United
States, payments in cash accounted for 20:9% of the volume of consumer transactions and
33:7% of the number of consumer transactions.2 This observation suggests that credit is not
available in numerous circumstances and hence that participation in the credit markets is
limited.3 The estimation by the Survey of Consumer Finances that 27:3% of U.S. households
did not have a general-purpose bank-type credit card in 2001 is further evidence of limited
participation in credit markets.
1For a history of credit cards, see Evans and Schmalensee (2005).
2The Nilson Report, December 2009. The share of all paper-based monetary instruments in 2008 was
42:8% in value and 48:1% in the number of transactions.
3See Telyukova (2009) for a discussion on how to classify expenditures between those for which consumers
had the option to use credit cards and those that could only be settled with cash in recent years.
2In this paper, I analyze the welfare implications of the increased use of credit as a means
of payment in the presence of limited participation in the credit market. For this, I build
a microfounded monetary model ￿ la Lagos and Wright (2005) in which agents can use
both credit issued by ￿nancial intermediaries and outside money as media of exchange.4
The model presented captures the main feature that distinguishes credit from money: While
credit allows delaying settlement if an opportunity of consumption arises, money balances
must be held in advance in order to settle a transaction and therefore are exposed to in￿ ation.
To study an economy with limited participation in the credit market, I assume that the use of
bank credit in trade depends upon the availability of a technology: e.g., credit cards can only
be used if a card reader is available. This technology determines the number of transactions
that can be settled with credit every period. Since agents face uncertainty regarding their
ability to use credit, a precautionary demand for money emerges endogenously.
In this model, in￿ ation deteriorates welfare by two channels. First, as is usual in monetary
models, in￿ ation reduces lifetime consumption by increasing the marginal cost of holding
money. In addition, in￿ ation negatively a⁄ects welfare because it makes consumption-risk
sharing less e¢ cient. Since it reduces consumption by agents in periods in which they cannot
borrow and increases consumption by agents when they are able to use credit, agents are
less able to smooth consumption across periods.
The model presented is suitable for studying the consequences of a technological improve-
ment in the credit sector which allows agents to resort to credit more often and thereby gives
rise to a higher share of credit transactions. Interestingly, broadening the use of credit has an
ambiguous e⁄ect on welfare, because it can make consumption-risk sharing more ine¢ cient.
As stated by Green (2001), several studies, like Schreft (1992) and Aiyagari, Braun and
Eckstein (1998), predict that greater innovation in the credit sector would reduce the welfare
cost of in￿ ation. Indeed, an increase in access to credit is expected to generate a welfare
gain stemming from a lower exposure to in￿ ation: If agents can rely more on credit, they
4Throughout this paper, the terms "credit" and "inside money" are used indistinguishably since credit is
the only type of inside money that I allow for in the model presented.
3can reduce their money holdings and hence su⁄er a lower impact from in￿ ation. However,
I calibrate the model to U.S. data and show that the improvement in the credit sector that
yielded a wider use of credit cards from 1990 to the near present entailed a negative welfare
gain. The reason is that consumption-risk sharing became more ine¢ cient.
In addition, the quantitative analysis allows me to calculate the welfare cost of in￿ ation
when credit is available, thus advancing the literature that aims at introducing the bank-
ing sector into the computations of the welfare cost of in￿ ation. The re￿nements to these
calculations have consisted mainly in taking the interest-bearing assets (in particular, bank
deposits) in agents￿monetary holdings into consideration, which are shown to a⁄ect the esti-
mates of the cost of in￿ ation.5 In￿ uencial work by Dotsey and Ireland (1996) and Lacker and
Schreft (1996), which incorporated credit within the analysis of the welfare cost of in￿ ation,
emphasized the diversion of resources to the credit sector. Instead, I calculate the welfare
cost of in￿ ation taking into account limited participation in the credit market. I ￿nd that
reducing annual in￿ ation from 10% to 0% is worth slightly more than 1% of steady-state
output.
Several papers have investigated the e⁄ects of technological changes a⁄ecting money
demand. Faig and Jerez (2007) develop a model that is able to account for the decline in
money demand in the U.S. by integrating technological factors that have made portfolio
adjustments easier. English (1999) studies the relationship between in￿ ation and ￿nancial
sector size. His model predicts an ambiguous e⁄ect of an increase in the productivity of the
￿nancial sector on welfare, although this depends on the assumption that in￿ ation does not
distort labor and saving decisions. My work is also related to Reed and Waller (2006) who
assume heterogeneity across agents arising from endowment shocks to study how money can
help to overcome ine¢ cient risk sharing. Aiyagari and Williamson (2000) also study the
distribution of consumption and welfare in a framework with dynamic contracts o⁄ered by
￿nancial intermediaries, limited participation and private information. However, in these
papers, the consequences of increased access to credit are not analyzed.6
5See Simonsen and Cisne (2001), Alvarez and Lippi (2009) and Attanasio, Guiso and Jappelli (2002).
6Other articles considered limited participation in the credit market for di⁄erent purposes. For instance,
4The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section II the model is described. In Section
III I de￿ne the symmetric equilibrium and point out its main features. Section IV is devoted
to the quantitative analysis. Finally, Section V concludes.
2 The model
The original framework I build on is the divisible-money model by Lagos and Wright. The
main advantage of this framework is that it facilitates the introduction of heterogeneity
in production and consumption preferences as well as the divisibility of money, keeping
the distribution of money holdings degenerate and, thus, analytically tractable. Similar to
Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2007), I introduce banks. The di⁄erence is that, while in
their model banks redistribute money from depositors to borrowers, I allow banks to issue
credit with no reserve requirements. I do not allow agents to deposit money and earn interest
on it as in Berentsen et al. because my focus is on the consequences of credit.
Time is discrete and in￿nite. There is a continuum of in￿nitely lived agents of unit
mass and one perfectly divisible and non-storable good. Agents discount across periods with
factor ￿ 2 (0;1). In each period, two competitive markets open sequentially. Before the
￿rst market opens, agents get a preference shock by which they either want to consume but
cannot produce (with probability (1 ￿ s)) or can produce but do not want to consume (with
probability s). I call "buyers" the agents who get the ￿rst type of shock and "sellers" those
who get the second type. In the ￿rst market, buyers get utility u(q) when they consume
a quantity q of the unique good, with u0 (q) > 0, u00 (q) < 0, u0 (0) = +1 and u0 (1) = 0.
For sellers, producing a quantity q represents a disutility equal to c(q) with c0 (q) > 0 and
Monnet and Roberds (2008) develop a model to rationalize the "no-surcharge rule" by which no premium
should be applied to purchases with credit cards. Many recent theoretical papers have analyzed the co-
existence of outside money and credit or inside money in a microfounded framework of monetary exchange,
like Shi (1996), Cavalcanti and Wallace (1999), He, Huang and Wright (2008), Williamson (1999, 2004),
Telyukova and Wright (2008), and Li (2006, 2009). But they abstract from the risk-sharing dimension of
the extension of credit explored in this paper.
5c00 (q) > 0.
In the second market all agents can consume and produce. Consuming x gives utility
U (x) with U0 (x) > 0 and U00 (x) 6 0. Disutility cost from producing x is equal to h, where
one unit of labor yields one unit of the consumption good.
In addition, there is an intrinsically useless object I refer to as outside money. The supply
of outside money is subject to central bank decisions which are considered as exogenous. I
call Mt the per capita money stock in period t. The money stock grows at a rate ￿ with
￿ > 0. Agents receive lump-sum transfers equal to (￿ ￿ 1)Mt￿1 during the second market
in t, where the subscript ￿1 indicates the previous period (and +1 indicates the following
period). Thus Mt = ￿Mt￿1.
In order to motivate a role for money, traders are assumed to be anonymous so that sellers
require compensation simultaneously as they produce. This assumption rules out bilateral
credit; however, it does not con￿ ict with the existence of lending in this model because this
only requires that agents are identi￿ed by banks.
Credit is issued as a bilateral contract between an agent and a bank by which the bank
gives an amount l of inside money to the agent before the ￿rst market opens and the agent
must pay it back at the end of the period.7 Banks have enforcement power; thus default
and, consequently, loan size are not an issue.8
Banks are competitive and operate at zero cost so that credit is costless for traders. This
assumption is made for simplicity but justi￿ed in that the model focuses on the extension
of credit within the period. Thus, it is well-suited for accounting for the convenience credit
granted by credit-cards issuers during the grace period, for which no interest is charged.9
7I do not explicitly include an exchange rate between inside and outside money (it is set to 1). This is
with no loss, since I will only consider stationary equilibria in which the real amount of money balances and
the real amount of loans are time-invariant.
8Berentsen et al. also consider the case in which banks have no enforcement power, because they aim
at studying the relationship between in￿ ation and default. Given my purpose, I only consider the simpler
setting of full enforcement.
9Since my ultimate aim is to quantitatively analyze the increased use of credit cards, I also assume
away ￿xed costs in the use of credit based on the fact that most credit cards do not charge annual fees.
6Access to credit is determined by an exogenous technology. In each period, agents face
a probability ￿ of being able to borrow. Hence, participation in the credit market is idio-
syncratic and random, as in the cited work by Aiyagari and Williamson and Monnet and
Roberds, among others. This modeling choice will be suitable for re￿ ecting that technologi-
cal improvements a⁄ecting credit cards have translated into a higher probability for buyers
of being able to conduct a transaction with credit.10 Agents learn whether they will be able
to borrow simultaneously to learning that they are buyers.
3 Symmetric equilibrium
I will consider symmetric and stationary equilibria in which strategies are the same across
agents, real allocations are constant over time, ￿ is time-invariant and end-of-period real
money balances are constant, so I ignore index t. This implies ￿M = ￿+1M+1, where ￿ is
the price of money in the second market in a given period, and
￿ = M+1=M = ￿=￿+1 (1)
I indicate by W (m;l) the expected value of entering the second market with an amount
m of money and an amount l of loans. V (m) is the expected value of entering the ￿rst
market with an amount m of money. In this section, the model is solved backwards for a
representative period.
3.1 The Second Market
In the second market, agents consume x, produce h, repay credit borrowed at the beginning
of the current period (l) and choose the amount of outside money that they will take into
Furthermore, most convenience users receive rewards for using their credit cards as described by Evans and
Schmalensee.
10For instance Humphrey (2004) ￿nds that a larger use of credit cards is closely related to the di⁄usion of
card terminals.
7the following period (m+1). The representative agent￿ s program is
W (m;l) = max
x;h;m+1
￿





s.t. x + ￿m+1 = h + ￿
￿
m ￿ l + (￿ ￿ 1)M￿1
￿
After inserting the budget constraint into (2), the ￿rst-order conditions are
U








+1 (m+1) is the marginal value of outside money taken into the following period. The
envelope conditions are
Wm = ￿, Wl = ￿￿ (4)
3.2 The First Market
The expected lifetime utility for an agent who holds an amount m of money before entering
the ￿rst market is
V (m) = (1 ￿ s)￿ [u(q‘) + W (m + l ￿ pq‘;l)] (5)
+ (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)[u(qn) + W (m ￿ pqn;0)]
+ s[￿c(qs) + W (m + pqs;0)]
where p is the price of the good in the ￿rst market. q‘ is the quantity of good that the buyer
consumes when he is able to borrow, qn is the quantity that he consumes if he is not able to
borrow, and qs is the quantity the seller sells in exchange for an amount of money equal to
pqs.
Denote m￿1 as the amount of money brought by the representative agent from the pre-
vious period. The problem for an agent who is a seller in the ￿rst market is
max
qs
[￿c(qs) + W (m￿1 + pqs;0)]
Using (4), the ￿rst-order condition is
c
0 (qs) = ￿p (6)
8Buyers face a di⁄erent problem depending on whether they can borrow or not. The
decision￿ s variables for a buyer who is able to borrow are q‘ and l. His problem is to solve
max
q‘;l
[u(q‘) + W (m￿1 + l ￿ pq‘;l)]
s.t. pq‘ ￿ m￿1 + l
The buyer maximizes his utility subject to the cash constraint, which means that he cannot
spend more money than the amount that he brings into the market. In the case of the buyer
who can borrow, this amount is given by the sum of the money taken from the previous
period and the amount of loans borrowed at the beginning of the current period. Since
banks can fully enforce the repayment of loans, borrowers can borrow as much as they want
and the cash-constraint is never binding for them. Using (4) and (6), ￿rst-order conditions
on q‘ and l yield
u
0 (q‘) = c
0 (qs) (7)
For a buyer who is not able to borrow inside money, the problem is to choose qn
max
qn
[u(qn) + W (m￿1 ￿ pqn;0)]
s.t. pqn ￿ m￿1
Using (4) and (6), the ￿rst-order condition reduces to
u
0 (qn) = c
0 (qs)(1 + ￿=￿)
where ￿ is the multiplier on the cash constraint for the agent unable to borrow.
From (5), the marginal value of outside money is
V
0 (m) = ￿ + ￿(1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)[u
0 (qn)=c
0 (qs) ￿ 1] (8)
In a stationary equilibrium, I can use (3) lagged one period and (1) to obtain
￿=￿ ￿ 1 = (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)[u
0 (qn)=c
0 (qs) ￿ 1] (9)
Finally, for market clearing, the following condition must hold in equilibrium:
sqs = (1 ￿ s)[￿q‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)qn] (10)
9De￿nition 1 A monetary equilibrium with both outside money and credit is fqn;q‘;qsg
satisfying (7), (9) and (10).
In order to characterize the equilibrium, I derive the planner￿ s solution; i.e., consumption
and production quantities that maximize welfare. Since I assume that all agents are treated
symmetrically, maximizing welfare implies maximizing the expected steady-state lifetime
utility of the representative agent, which is
(1 ￿ ￿)W = (1 ￿ s)[￿u(q‘) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(qn)] ￿ sc(qs) + U (x) ￿ x (11)
while the feasibility constraint is
sqs = (1 ￿ s)[￿q‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)qn] (12)
The planner maximizes (11) subject to (12) to get the ￿rst-best allocation. This satis￿es
U
0 (x










Thus, welfare maximization implies q￿
n = q￿





￿ (1 ￿ s)=s) (13)
Proposition 1 a) If ￿ > ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1), a unique monetary equilibrium with both outside
money and credit exists. If c0 (qs) > 1, qn and q‘ satisfy qn < q￿ < q‘. b) If ￿ = 1 and ￿ > ￿,
outside money is driven out by credit. q‘ satis￿es q‘ = q￿. c) If ￿ = ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1), credit
is driven out by outside money. qn and q‘ satisfy qn = q‘ = q￿.
Proof. See appendix.
According to Proposition 1, a unique equilibrium exists in which both outside money
and credit are used, when the economy is away from the Friedman rule and the event
of not being able to borrow in the following period occurs with some probability. The
consumption quantity that the buyer who is not able to borrow attains is lower than the
consumption quantity acquired by the buyer able to borrow. This is because the former
10is cash-constrained. With outside money only, the e¢ cient consumption quantity cannot
be attained since a positive in￿ ation requires a higher marginal value of outside money for
agents to accept it, which is equivalent to a higher marginal utility from consumption, and
thus a lower consumption quantity.
Buyers who borrow get a consumption quantity that is higher than the e¢ cient quantity
de￿ned in (13). This is because these buyers bene￿t from the constraint on the buyers who
cannot borrow which keeps the sellers￿marginal cost below the marginal cost at the e¢ cient
quantity. Thus, in this equilibrium there is ine¢ cient consumption-risk sharing across buyers.
If ￿ = 1 and ￿ > ￿, nobody is willing to hold outside money, as outside money need not
play the insurance role anymore. Therefore, an equilibrium with outside money cannot be
sustained. On the contrary, when ￿ = ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1), credit turns out to be useless because
outside money becomes a costless way of acquiring consumption. Agents take the necessary
amount of outside money across periods in order to get e¢ cient trade and can refrain from
borrowing.11 In both equilibria with either credit or outside money, consumption-risk sharing
is e¢ cient. For the rest of the analysis, I will focus on the case ￿ > ￿ and ￿ < 1.
Proposition 2 qn and qs are decreasing in ￿. If c0 (qs) > 1, q‘ is increasing in ￿. An
increase in ￿ is welfare-worsening.
Proof. Immediate from (7), (9), (10) and (11).
Proposition 2 states that an increase in in￿ ation has an asymmetric e⁄ect on buyers.
Consumption quantity decreases for buyers who cannot borrow and increases for buyers who
can borrow, since the latter bene￿t from a higher constraint on buyers who use only outside
money. Overall production decreases and welfare worsens because higher in￿ ation makes
consumption-risk sharing more ine¢ cient; i.e., consumption decreases for buyers whose mar-
ginal utility is higher and increases for those whose marginal utility is lower.12
11Given that borrowing is costless, multiple equilibria with di⁄erent amounts of l exist when ￿ = ￿.
12This result is similar to those in studies already cited by Reed and Waller and Aiyagari and Williamson.
11Proposition 3 qn is decreasing in ￿ while the e⁄ect of ￿ on q‘ and qs is ambiguous. An
increase in ￿ has a negative e⁄ect on welfare along the intensive margin and a positive e⁄ect
along the extensive margin. The overall e⁄ect on welfare is ambiguous.
Proof. See appendix.
When ￿ increases, qn certainly decreases, while this is not always the case for q‘. Buyers
face a di⁄erent situation when ￿ increases depending on whether they have access to credit
or not. qs can decrease or increase when ￿ increases depending on parameters￿values, so
borrowers could consume either more or less: They adjust their marginal utility to the
marginal cost of sellers. However, an increase in ￿ has a direct e⁄ect that a⁄ects only buyers
who do not borrow. As can be seen from (9), increasing ￿ reduces the marginal value of
money. Therefore, agents desire a lower level of money holdings to be taken across periods,
which reduces the price of money. As a result, buyers who cannot borrow are more cash-
constrained and consume less.
The e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ on welfare is ambiguous because it makes some high-marginal
utility buyers consume more and some consume less. We can interpret it as the combination
of an extensive-margin e⁄ect and an intensive-margin e⁄ect. The extensive-margin e⁄ect
consists in an increase in consumption and production owing to a higher measure of agents
who can borrow; i.e., u(q‘) ￿ u(qn) ￿ c0 (qs)(q‘ ￿ qn), which is unambiguously positive.
The intensive-margin e⁄ect re￿ ects the changes in quantities traded as a consequence of an
increase in ￿. This e⁄ect is always negative for non-borrowers and su¢ cient for a negative
intensive-margin e⁄ect when computing welfare for the whole population. The reason is that
borrowers get e¢ cient trade in equilibrium, so that an increase (decrease) in their utility is
exactly compensated for by an increase (decrease) in sellers￿disutility. The overall intensive
margin-e⁄ect is then (1 ￿ ￿)(@qn=@￿)[u0 (qn) ￿ c0 (qs)] < 0.13
Note that the ambiguity of the e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ does not hinge on the existence
of a strictly convex cost function. A linear cost function would make it possible to determine
13I have examined a version of this model in which one group of agents can borrow permanently while
another group is excluded from the credit market. The e⁄ect of ￿ is also ambiguous in that case.
12q‘ independently of ￿ and ￿, but there would still be a positive e⁄ect of an increase in ￿
given by the larger measure of agents consuming q‘ and a negative e⁄ect given by a lower qn.
Analogously, assuming bilateral bargaining in the ￿rst market would make q‘ be independent
of ￿ and ￿, but the existence of a positive extensive-margin e⁄ect and a negative intensive-
margin e⁄ect would be preserved.
4 Quantitative analysis
Given that the formal analysis does not admit a conclusion on how an increase in ￿ a⁄ects
welfare, I proceed to a calibration of the theoretical model. In addition, the calibration allows
me to measure the welfare cost of in￿ ation in the presence of limited participation in the
credit market as well as the cost of ine¢ cient risk sharing arising from limited participation.
The basic feature of the model presented is the existence of two types of transactions:
those which involve a credit operation and those which are immediately settled and hence
require an investment in the form of money balances. Among the payment instruments
actually used, I identify the former with the use of credit cards and the latter with the use of
monetary instruments such as cash, debit cards, and checks. Revolving credit does not arise
in this model owing to the quasi-linear preferences in the settlement stage, so that credit is
extended within the period. I interpret this credit operation as the grace period granted by
credit card issuers, during which no interest is charged on the outstanding balance. This
credit operation is usually referred to as convenience credit. My analysis concerns the e⁄ect
of the availability of convenience credit for a subset of transactions, those carried out with
credit cards, whereas the rest of transactions are immediately settled.14
14I consider convenience credit instead of total consumer credit because the former can be identi￿ed in its
use as a means of payment and hence linked to the purchase of goods and services, whereas total consumer
credit includes loans that may have other purposes not related to the mechanism highlighted in this paper
(e.g., the repayment of other debts). Convenience credit can also be imputed to a particular period.
134.1 Calibration
I use U.S. data for the period 1959-2003, with the exception of data on credit-card transac-
tions which have only become available in recent years. I use the following functional forms
generally used in the literature: u(q) = (q￿)=￿, U(x) = B ln(x) and c(qs) = qs (below I
consider a strictly convex cost function). The parameters to be identi￿ed are: (i) preference
parameters: ￿, ￿, B; (ii) technology parameters: ￿, s; and (iii) a policy parameter: ￿.
For my baseline calibration, I follow Lucas (2000) and Lagos and Wright and calibrate the
model so as to ￿t the observed relationship between yearly money demand and the nominal
interest rate during the sample period. I consider data on money demand and the commercial
paper rate, denoted by i = ￿=￿ ￿ 1.15 I normalize s = 0:5 so as to make the calibration
comparable with the one in Lagos and Wright, who equate the probability of a single-
coincidence meeting in which the agent is a seller to 0:5 for most of their speci￿cations (in
the robustness section, I present an alternative calibration which determines s). I determine
the value of ￿ by using the ratio ￿ of the number of transactions carried out with credit
cards to the number of all transactions. In the model, borrowers carry out one transaction
with money and one transaction with credit, whereas non-borrowers carry out only one
transaction with money. Sellers purchase goods during the second market; they carry out
one transaction for which no credit is granted. Thus, ￿ is:
￿ ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ s)=[1 + ￿ (1 ￿ s)]
The average value of ￿ for the period 1990-2003 is 0:167.16 Therefore, ￿ = 0:402. In
order to identify the remaining parameters (￿;B), I ￿nd the best ￿t to yearly money
15The interest rate is the short-term commercial paper rate, taken from the Economic Report of the
President (2009, Table B-73). For the computation of money demand I use the following data: The money
supply is M1 in billions of dollars, December of each year, not seasonally adjusted, taken from the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED Database; the real gross domestic product is in billions of chained (2000)
dollars, taken from the Economic Report of the President (2009, Table B-2); the implicit price de￿ ator for
GDP equals 1.0 in 2000 and is taken from the National Income and Product Accounts of the United States.
16The Nilson Report and Statistical Abstract of the United States, several years. The period to compute ￿
is based on data availability. Transactions considered are conducted with checks, cash, money orders, o¢ cial
14demand. In the model the household￿ s money balance is m = pqn; nominal output is
p(1 ￿ s)[￿q‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)qn] in the ￿rst market and x￿=￿ = B=￿ in the second market. Then,
money demand L satis￿es
L ￿ qn=f(1 ￿ s)[￿q‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)qn] + Bg (14)
When ￿tting money demand I set ￿ equal to 0 to facilitate a comparison with previous work
(however, ￿tting money demand as a function of i by taking into account changes in ￿ over
time generates similar parameter values because estimated values of ￿ are small for most of
the sample period). I get ￿ = 0:798 and B = 2:524.
4.2 Welfare Analysis
Table 1 illustrates the cost of in￿ ation estimated with the calibrated model. I calculate it by
computing how much consumption an agent would give up at 0% in￿ ation rate to have the
expected utility that corresponds to an annual rate of in￿ ation of 10%. With a slight abuse
of notation, I write the agent￿ s expected utility as a function of (￿;￿;￿), with ￿ ￿ 0:
(1 ￿ ￿)V (￿;￿;￿)
= U (￿x
￿) ￿ x
￿ + (1 ￿ s)[￿u(￿q‘ (￿;￿)) + (1 ￿ ￿)u(￿qn (￿;￿))] ￿ sc(qs (￿;￿))
I calculate the cost of 10% annual in￿ ation as opposed to 0% in￿ ation by ￿nding the value
￿
￿











where ￿ ￿ is the calibrated value of ￿. I also calculate ￿
￿
F, the factor that would render an
agent indi⁄erent between 10% of annual in￿ ation and a rate of in￿ ation consistent with
the Friedman rule (i.e., ￿ = ￿). In the calibrated model, diminishing the yearly in￿ ation
checks, traveler￿ s checks, food stamps, credit cards, debit cards, prepaid cards, EBT cards, preauthorized
payments and remote payments. I consider all monetary instruments as money balances except for credit
cards, even though other instruments, like checks, may involve a shorter credit operation.
15from 10% to 0% is worth 1:061% of steady-state consumption, while diminishing the yearly
in￿ ation from 10% to ￿4% is worth 1:286% of steady-state consumption. This estimation
is in line with those presented by Lucas (2000) and Lagos and Wright in the case where
the buyer has all the bargaining power, the one that admits a comparison to a competitive
pricing set-up. As stated in the description of the model, the reason why in￿ ation deteriorates
welfare is not only that it reduces lifetime consumption, but also that it makes risk sharing
less e¢ cient: The ratio qn=q‘ is 53:7% at 0% in￿ ation and only 14:3% at 10% annual in￿ ation.
Table 1
Welfare cost of in￿ ation & welfare cost of an increase in ￿
￿ = ￿ ￿ = 1 ￿ = 1:1 ￿ = 0:327 (1990) ￿ = 0:418 (2003)
qn=q‘ 1:000 0:537 0:143 0:329 0:282









Table 1 also reports the cost of ine¢ cient consumption-risk sharing owing to an increased
access to credit. I calculate what percentage of steady-state consumption would render agents
indi⁄erent between the value of ￿ in 1990 (0:327) and its value in 2003 (0:418), when in￿ ation








= V (￿ ￿;0:418;1)
I ￿nd that the increase in ￿ which occurred between 1990 and 2003 has entailed a welfare
loss equivalent to 0:024% of steady-state consumption. This ￿gure seems reasonable, since
it is not necessarily sensible to argue that a larger access to credit deteriorates welfare
17The in￿ ation rate is the average change of the Consumer Price Index series for 1959-2003 from the FRED
Database. Considering the average in￿ ation for 1990-2003 gives rise to a slightly higher welfare loss.
16considerably. The point that I want to emphasize is that improvements in the credit sector
that caused the number of borrowers to increase did not give rise to an overall welfare
gain: The negative e⁄ect on the consumption of agents who are unable to borrow has been
su¢ ciently strong compared to the bene￿t of broadening the set of circumstances in which
agents may resort to credit.18
To see that this result pertains to a particular combination of parameter values, Figure
1 depicts the welfare cost of increasing ￿ as a function of ￿. I compute the percentage of
steady-state consumption that would render agents indi⁄erent between each depicted value
of ￿ and a value 10% lower (1 ￿ ￿￿
0:9) when in￿ ation is kept at its calibrated value. Welfare
losses stemming from changes in risk sharing occur at relatively low values of ￿, for which
the intensive margin e⁄ect happens to be quantitatively more important than the extensive
margin e⁄ect. In contrast, increasing the access to credit is bene￿cial in terms of welfare for
su¢ ciently high values of ￿. The reason is that the welfare cost of in￿ ation is increasing in
￿ up to a critical point of ￿ and decreases for higher values of ￿.
The e⁄ect of an increase in ￿ also depends on the level of in￿ ation. From Figure 1
it is clear that the threshold above which an increase in ￿ is welfare-improving is lower
when in￿ ation is higher: It is ￿ = 0:583 when yearly in￿ ation is 4:3% and ￿ = 0:255 when
yearly in￿ ation is 10%. This result is in accord with previous work in which credit may be
supported in equilibrium despite being detrimental for welfare and in which credit is more
likely to be welfare-improving if in￿ ation is su¢ ciently high, as in Chiu and Meh (2008) and
Dong (2009). However, credit is costless here so that welfare losses stem entirely from the
general equilibrium e⁄ect by which a broader access to credit lowers the value of money and
prevents agents from bene￿tting from optimal smoothness in consumption across periods.
18The fall in qn as a consequence of a reduction in money demand when ￿ increases is consistent with
empirical ￿ndings. For instance, Duca and Whitesell (1995) ￿nd that ownership of credit cards in the U.S.
is negatively related to checking balances.
17Figure 1. Welfare cost of an increase in ￿ as a function of ￿
4.3 Robustness
The results presented in the previous section are easily comparable with earlier work. Next,
I repeat the procedure described above by setting a model period as a month, since it is
the most suitable length to replicate the grace period granted by credit-card issuers. In
addition, in order to assess how robust the results reported are, I recalibrate the model by
using data on the credit-card share of transactions in volume. In this variant, the simulation
results con￿rm the main pattern described above, suggesting that the identi￿ed relationship
between access to credit and welfare is quite robust. Moreover, this calibration predicts a
much stronger deterioration of welfare owing to the change in ￿ between 1990 and 2003.
In the monthly version of the calibration presented above, only high values of s are
compatible with plausible parameters￿values. The reason is that the model has to match a
high level of money demand, which is increasing in s (up to values of s close to unity): If
there are more sellers per consumer, the purchasing power of money increases so that the
numerator in (14) increases whereas the denominator decreases. Thus, I set s = 0:9. To test
if results are sensitive to the cost function, I assume c(qs) = (qs)
￿ and consider both ￿ = 1
18and ￿ > 1. By ￿tting the observed relationship between monthly money demand and the
interest rate, I get ￿ = 0:926, B = 0:171 and ￿ = 1:002, and ￿ = 0:924 and B = 0:166 when
￿ is set to 1.
The procedure followed for the alternative calibration is to match the average value of
the credit-card share of consumer payments in volume and other targets to characterize the
steady-state allocations consistent with the data. As it is standard, ￿ is set so that the
implied annual real interest rate is 4%; i.e., ￿ = 0:997. The monthly average in￿ ation for
1959-2003 gives ￿ ￿ 1 = 0:351%. ￿ is set to 1. The remaining four parameters are identi￿ed
jointly so as to match four targets: the ratio ￿, the sample average of money demand (equal
to 2:148), the ratio { of the value of transactions carried out with credit cards to the value
of all transactions and the interest elasticity of money demand ￿. In the model, { is
{ ￿ (1 ￿ s)￿l=f(1 ￿ s)[￿pq‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)pqn + ￿l + m]g
= ￿ (q‘ ￿ qn)=[2￿ (q‘ ￿ qn) + 2qn]
The numerator of { shows the amount of credit spent by borrowers in each period. In the
denominator, the values of all transactions in both markets are added together. By equating
{ to the sample average of 20:9% of the ratio of credit-card transactions to total transactions
in volume for the period 1990-2003, I get the third restriction to pin down (￿;s;￿;B).
In the model, the interest elasticity of money demand is:
￿ ￿ [(1 ￿ s)￿q‘ + B]L(￿=￿ ￿ 1)=
￿





I obtain the fourth equation to pin down (￿;s;￿;B) by equating ￿ to ￿0:5 as generally
reported in the literature (e.g., Ho⁄man & Rasche, 1991). I get s = 0:774, ￿ = 0:886,
￿ = 0:606 and B = 0:042. Table 2 summarizes the parameters￿values from the two monthly
calibrations considered: the baseline calibration, with linear and convex cost functions, and
the calibration which matches the ratio {.
19Table 2
Parameters￿values - Monthly Calibration
Ratio { Fit money demand
Linear cost Convex cost
￿ 0:886 0:402 0:402
s 0:774 0:9 0:9
￿ 1 1 1:002
B 0:042 0:166 0:171
￿ 0:606 0:924 0:926
Finally, Table 3 displays the welfare cost of the change in ￿ between 1990 and 2003 and
the welfare cost of a yearly in￿ ation of 10% for both of the calibrations performed. The
calibrated parameters obtained by ￿tting monthly money demand generate estimates of the
welfare cost of in￿ ation and the welfare cost of the increase in ￿ that are similar to those
computed with an annual model. In contrast, the calibrated model that is consistent with
the ratio { gives rise to a considerably higher welfare cost of an increase in ￿, equivalent
to 0:319% of steady-state consumption. However, this cost appears to be lower for higher
values of ￿ as in the baseline calibration.
Table 3
Welfare cost of in￿ ation & welfare cost of an increase in ￿
Ratio { Fit money demand
Linear cost Convex cost
1 ￿ ￿
￿
0 (%) 0:860 1:019 1:015
1 ￿ ￿￿
1990 (%) 0:319 0:021 0:021
20As veri￿ed by the values given in Table 3, the results do not depend upon the cost-
function assumption. Since the preference parameters estimated when ￿ is set to 1 and when
￿ is ￿tted are similar, the implied welfare functions are also similar. Instead, the coe¢ cient of
risk aversion (1 ￿ ￿) is important to explain the shape of the welfare function. Simulations
performed show that the welfare cost of increasing ￿ is decreasing in (1 ￿ ￿) up to a certain
threshold and then increasing in it. When agents are too risk-averse, they protect themselves
by holding higher money holdings; as a result, qn is higher and the reduction in qn owing to an
increase in ￿ is lower (the intensive-margin e⁄ect is small). At the other extreme, when agents
are almost risk-neutral, the reduction in qn does not negatively a⁄ect them provided that
they consume q‘ more frequently which is the case when ￿ increases. Moreover, the welfare
cost of an increase in ￿ is greatly determined by B: When B is low, the value of the foregone
consumption that makes agents indi⁄erent between two di⁄erent values of ￿ is also low, so
its quantity as a percentage of steady-state consumption has to be high. The combination
of a medium value of (1 ￿ ￿) and a low value of B explains that the alternative calibration
generates a high cost of increasing ￿. In this sense, the baseline calibration gives conservative
estimates of the welfare cost of the increase in ￿. Thus, the main results described seem to
be robust with regard to the calibration procedure: In both of the calibrations presented
the welfare cost of in￿ ation appears to be a non-monotone function of ￿, increasing up to a
certain value of ￿ and decreasing for higher values of ￿.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a model in which outside money and credit are used as media of ex-
change in order to analyze how the existence of a credit market characterized by limited
participation impacts on welfare when the economy is away from the Friedman rule. In￿ a-
tion is shown to be unambiguously welfare-worsening as it makes consumption risk-sharing
more ine¢ cient, both across individuals and over time for a given agent. Technological im-
provements which allow the proportion of transactions that can be settled with credit each
21period to increase have an ambiguous impact on welfare as, on the one hand, they expand
access to credit and, on the other hand, reduce the utility of non-borrowers.
The quantitative analysis shows that the increased access to convenience credit expe-
rienced in the United States since 1990 has not been bene￿cial in terms of welfare. Indeed,
money demand has declined owing to the greater availability of credit as a means of payment,
thereby tightening cash constraints when credit is not available. For plausible values of the
coe¢ cient of risk aversion, the utility gain achieved by using credit cards in a higher fraction
of purchases to relax the cash-constraint has not been su¢ cient to outweigh the loss resulting
from being more cash-constrained when credit-card use is not possible. Consequently, agents
have su⁄ered from a higher exposure to in￿ ation. This conclusion is obtained using two
di⁄erent quantitative procedures: The ￿rst one follows the approach of ￿tting the observed
relationship between money demand and the interest rate and the second one uses data
on the share of credit-cards transactions. However, the analysis presented suggests that, if
agents were able to resort to credit more frequently, then the negative e⁄ect described might
become less important and the improvements that increase the proportion of transactions
settled using credit might actually be welfare improving. When access to credit is broadened
su¢ ciently, the cost of in￿ ation is more likely to be e⁄ectively reduced.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: To see that there are only one quantity qn and one quantity q‘ that
solve (7) and (9) when ￿ > ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1), insert (10) into (7) and (9) and compare the
slope of the function q‘ (qn) implicit in (7) with the slope of the function q‘ (qn) implicit in
(9). I indicate the former by @q‘=@qn and the latter by ^ @q‘=^ @qn. From (7) and (9), the
following can be deduced by using the implicit function theorem:
@q‘=@qn = c
00 (qs)(1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)[u
00 (q‘)s ￿ c
00 (qs)(1 ￿ s)￿]
￿1 < 0




00 (qs)(1 ￿ s)￿]
￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ < 0
22It follows that j@q‘=@qnj <
￿ ￿ ￿^ @q‘=^ @qn
￿ ￿ ￿ if and only if
u
0 (qn)u
00 (q‘)(1 ￿ ￿)=c
0 (qs) + u
00 (qn)￿ < su
00 (qn)u
00 (q‘)=[(1 ￿ s)c
00 (qs)] (15)
The left-hand side in (15) is negative and the right-hand side is positive, so this inequality
always holds. From (7), qn ! 1 when q‘ ! 0 and q‘ = ￿ q‘ when qn ! 0; where ￿ q‘ satis￿es
u0 (￿ q‘) = c0 (￿￿ q‘ (1 ￿ s)=s). From (9), q‘ ! 1 when qn ! 0 and qn = ￿ qn when q‘ ! 0; where
￿ qn satis￿es u0 (￿ qn)=c0 (￿ qn (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ s)=s) = (￿=￿ ￿ 1)=[(1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)]+1. Since the slope
of the second curve is steeper than the ￿rst one for all qn and the ￿rst curve intercepts only
the axis q‘ at a ￿nite number while the second curve intercepts only the axis qn, both curves
intersect in the space (qn;q‘) at only one point. If c0 (qs) = 1, qn and q‘ are independently
and uniquely determined by (7) and (9).
That in equilibrium qn < q‘ when ￿ > ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1) can be deduced from the
concavity of u(q) and (7) and (9). To see that q‘ > q￿ when c0 (qs) > 1, compare (13) to
(7). ￿q‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)qn < q‘ since ￿ < 1 and q‘ > qn. Then u0 (q‘) < c0 (q‘ (1 ￿ s)=s) which
implies q￿ < q‘. In addition, (13) implies u0 (q) and ￿ c0 (q) = c0 (q (1 ￿ s)=s) intersect at q￿
and q‘ > q￿, so it must be that qs = [￿q‘ + (1 ￿ ￿)qn](1 ￿ s)=s < q￿ (1 ￿ s)=s for (7) to
hold. Hence, qn < q￿.
If ￿ = 1 and ￿ > ￿, (9) cannot hold, which implies that ￿V 0 (m) < ￿￿1 for all m > 0.
Thus m￿ = 0. If ￿ = ￿ and ￿ 2 (0;1), (7) and (9) are identical. Therefore, qn = q‘ = q￿. To
verify that V (m) is concave so that the solution to (3) is well-de￿ned, rewrite (8) as
V
0 (m) = (1 ￿ s)(1 ￿ ￿)u
0 (qn)=p + ￿[s + (1 ￿ s)￿]
Let m￿ = pq￿. As long as ￿ < 1, if m < m￿ then qn < q￿ which means @qn=@m > 0 so that
V 00 (m) < 0. If m = m￿ then qn = q￿ and @qn=@m = 0, so V 00 (m) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: From (7) and (9), it follows that @qn=@￿ < 0. Since the e⁄ect of ￿ on
q‘, qs and welfare is ambiguous, it is su¢ cient to consider examples that exhibit an opposite
relationship between ￿ and each of those variables.19 Di⁄erentiate (11) with respect to ￿. The
19Section 4 provides various examples. The function u(q) = q0:01 ln(q + 1:01) provides an example of q‘
increasing in ￿ (e.g., with s = 0:1, ￿ = 0:990001, ￿ = 0:99 and ￿ = 1:5).
23intensive margin e⁄ect is ￿ (@q‘=@￿)[u0 (q‘) ￿ c0 (qs)] + (1 ￿ ￿)(@qn=@￿)[u0 (qn) ￿ c0 (qs)] < 0.
Given c0 (qs) = u0 (q‘), the extensive margin e⁄ect is (1 ￿ s)[u(q‘) ￿ u(qn) ￿ u0 (q‘)(q‘ ￿ qn)].
By the mean value theorem there is a qm 2 (qn;q‘) such that u(q‘)￿u(qn)￿u0 (qm)(q‘ ￿ qn) =
0. Hence, u(q‘) ￿ u(qn) ￿ u0 (q‘)(q‘ ￿ qn) > 0.
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